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STATE AND LOCAL PROCEDURAL INJUSTICES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: THE EXPERIENCES
OF TALLEVAST, FLORIDA
BRETT M. PABEN*
ABSTRACT
Government decisions made at the local and state level are those
that most often directly affect communities. Participatory and procedural
protections under state and local, rather than federal law, therefore,
largely control the ability of grassroots environmental justice advocates
to shape government decisions important to their communities. Thus,
significant disparities in the standards of procedural justice differ not
only by which state an environmental justice community happens to be
located in, but also by the type of local government with authority over
that community. Frequently, this diminishes the empowerment efforts
of communities found in unincorporated areas. The community found in
Tallevast, Florida, is one such example of a community whose dedication
and struggles to achieve environmental justice have often been thwarted
by deficient state and local government procedural protections.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the central themes of environmental justice advocacy is the
equity of decision-making processes that affect communities.1 According
to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), environmental
justice “will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of protec-
tion from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the
decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to live,
learn, and work.”2 While federal environmental laws may have defi-
ciencies in regards to environmental justice, most statutes do contain
minimum public participation and informational access requirements.
Although the details of these participation processes are frequently within
an agency’s discretion, many federal agencies have been improving oppor-
tunities for addressing environmental justice concerns in their decision-
making processes.3
1 See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REPORTER:
NEWS AND ANALYSIS 10,681, 10,682 (2000); Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for
All: It’s the Right Thing to Do, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 281, 288 (1994); Sheila Foster, Justice
From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transforma-
tive Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 778, 808 (1998).
2 Envtl. Justice, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ [https://perma.cc/9BN8
-C7EY] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016) (emphasis added).
3 Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). See, e.g., Memorandum of Under-
standing on Environmental Justice and Executive Order 12898 (Aug. 4, 2011) (signed by
the heads of eleven covered federal agencies and six participating federal agencies and
offices), which resulted in several agencies developing environmental justice strategies.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ENVIRONMENTAL. JUSTICE STRATEGIC PLAN: 2012–2014 (2012);
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRAT-
EGY (2012). See also EPA, PLAN EJ 2014 (2011); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
(CEQ), ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT (1997).
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Many federal environmental statutes, however, require the EPA
to delegate to the States the authority to implement national require-
ments upon a state demonstrating the capability to administer the
federal program. While numerous federal agencies have made efforts to
incorporate environmental justice into their decision-making processes,
states have increasingly been delegated the primary responsibility for
national environmental programs. Ninety-six percent of all delegable fed-
eral environmental programs, for example, have been delegated to states,
which is nearly a thirty percent increase since 2001.4
Although the standards and EPA’s discretion to approve or disap-
prove delegation to the States vary across federal environmental laws,5
statutes typically require States to demonstrate equivalency with federal
public participation requirements, such as public notice of draft permits,
public comments and agency responses, and requests for public hearings.6
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),7 for example,
in order to qualify for delegation, “States need not implement provisions
identical to” EPA’s regulations, as long as the States “establish require-
ments at least as stringent as the corresponding [EPA] provisions.”8 In
the permitting context, quantitative criteria such as parts per million
(“ppm”) provide objective standards for EPA to evaluate the “as stringent
as” requirement.9 Assessing procedural protections, however, is typically
more subjective.
With States asserting an increased role in hazardous waste site
remediation because of this delegable authority,10 as well as the siting
and permitting decisions traditionally made at the local level, environ-
mental justice communities often operate within state-established proce-
dural requirements. The differences in procedural rights under state and
federal regulation may not be significant for some communities, but state
processes can have negative implications for many citizens, particularly
4 Delegation by Environmental Act, ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., https://web.archive.org
/web/20160324131707/http://ecos.org/section/states/enviro_actlist [https://perma.cc/6BQA
-NDM4] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016) (96 percent of programs were delegated to states in
2015, compared to 75 percent in 2001).
5 See, e.g., ROBERT ESWORTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS:
HOW ARE THEY ENFORCED? 10 (2014) (“In some cases, state primacy is almost automatic.”).
6 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 271.14(x)–(aa) (2016) (RCRA’s public participation equivalency
regulations).
7 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2012).
8 40 C.F.R. § 271.14 note (2016).
9 Id.
10 See SARAH GRACE LONGSWORTH ET AL., ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., STATE DELEGA-
TION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTS 9–12 (2016) (calculations by author).
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those in states without a commitment to environmental justice or public
participation in general. At the substate level, residents of unincorporated
areas face even greater procedural inequities compared to those who live
in incorporated municipalities. While influences in addition to processes
are factors, county governments typically fail to protect of-color and poor
unincorporated areas from locally undesirable land uses (“LULUs”) and
other environmental burdens.11 The numbers of citizens who end up fall-
ing through these procedural cracks, however, constitute a significant
portion of the population. In Florida, for example, this includes more than
half of the State’s population.12 The struggle of the community of Tallevast,
Florida, is one such example.
I. THE COMMUNITY OF TALLEVAST AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL
THREATS
Tallevast is a small, unincorporated community covering about
1.5 square miles in southern Manatee County, Florida. The community
extends two to three blocks both north and south of Tallevast Road, from
approximately 15th Street East to 19th Street East. The Tallevast com-
munity consists of approximately eighty-four households, which are almost
entirely African American.13 A majority of these households includes
descendants of at least one of Tallevast’s five founding families, who
settled the area as turpentiners following the Civil War. Tallevast con-
tains two churches—Mt. Tabor Missionary Baptist and Bryant Chapel
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church. Many residents have returned to
their extended family and community roots after obtaining their educa-
tion elsewhere—such as Dr. Clifford “Billy” Ward and his daughter, Dr.
Tasha Ward, who operate Ward Family Dentistry in Tallevast.
Although the economic welfare of Manatee County exceeds the
average for the State of Florida,14 Tallevast has often not received the
11 Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban
Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1151–55 (2008).
12 State & County QuickFacts: Florida, U.S. CENSUS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd
/states/12000.html [https://perma.cc/2UC2-NPHC] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016) (“White
alone, not Hispanic or Latino, percent” (2013): Florida: 56.4%, U.S.: 62.6%); A Quick Civic
Review, FLA. LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.floridaleagueofcities.com/Resources.aspx?CNID
=878 [https://perma.cc/88M6-JG82] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016) (“The majority of Floridians—
by a small percentage—live in unincorporated county areas.”).
13 The entire population of Manatee County (342,106) is 9.3% black. State & County Quick
Facts: Manatee County, Florida, U.S. CENSUS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12
/12081.html [https://perma.cc/3KRS-CRM2] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016) (2013 est.).
14 Id.
2017] THE EXPERIENCES OF TALLEVAST, FLORIDA 353
amenities and services provided to other parts of the county. Some
streets in the neighborhood remain unpaved, there are no sidewalks in
the neighborhood—even along heavily used Tallevast Road—sewer con-
nections were not made until 1985, and many residents did not have
access to the public water system before 2004.15 In 2003, residents held
a series of “visioning” sessions and formed the community group Family
Oriented Community United Strong (“FOCUS”) in efforts to improve the
quality of their neighborhood.16 Led by President Laura Ward and Vice
President Wanda Washington, FOCUS’s mission, and the direction of the
entire community, would quickly change.
A. Discovery of Contamination in the Community
In 1996, Lockheed Martin Corporation, the world’s largest defense
contractor,17 acquired the former American Beryllium Company (“ABC”)
site located on five acres of land at 1600 Tallevast Road as part of its
purchase of Loral’s defense electronics business.18 From 1961 to 1996,
ABC was an ultraprecision beryllium machine parts manufacturing facility,
where metals were milled, lathed, and drilled, as well as electroplated,
anodized, or ultrasonically cleaned, for various components, including parts
for nuclear warheads and the Hubble telescope.19 While the exact source
remains unknown, over a period of time encompassing decades, leaks or
discharges apparently occurred at a series of “sumps” associated with
ABC’s on-site wastewater treatment system, allowing contaminants, pri-
marily chlorinated solvents, to enter the soil and groundwater beneath
the facility.20 Sometime in 1999 or 2000, Lockheed Martin discovered the
groundwater beneath the ABC property was contaminated by a variety
15 See, e.g., Erin Bryce & Debi Springer, A Vision of Tallevast, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE
H12 (March 13, 2003); Erin Bryce, Water, Sewer and Paved Roads are on their Way,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE H1, H12 (Nov. 3, 2003). Sidewalks along Tallevast Road,
however, are currently scheduled for installation in the summer of 2016. See BD. CNTY.
COMM’RS, MANATEE CNTY., FLA., RES. B-16-033 (Sept. 15, 2015).
16 See, e.g., Editorial, Revitalizing Tallevast: County Commission Should Support Com-
munity’s Rebirth, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE (Mar. 17, 2003), at A12.
17 AUDE FLEURANT & SAM PERLO-FREEMAN, THE SIPRI TOP 100 ARMS-PRODUCING AND
MILITARY SERVICES COMPANIES, 2013 3 (Tbl. 1) (2014) (arms sales: $35.5 billion; profits:
$2.9 billion; employees: 116,000).
18 Final Order, Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
No. 11-0259, 2012 WL 36239, at 1 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings. Jan. 3, 2012).
19 Recommended Order, Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., No. 11-0259, at 2 (Fla. Div. of Admin Hearings Oct. 6, 2011).
20 Id.
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of pollutants.21 The full extent of the contamination is not known as the
groundwater has only been tested for a handful of the hundreds of chemi-
cals on the ABC’s Material Safety Data Sheet (“MSDS”), but the primary
“contaminants of concern” (“COCs”)—i.e., those occurring in concentrations
exceeding Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (“GCTLs”)—are trichloro-
ethylene (“TCE”), 1,4-dioxane (“dioxane”), tetrachloroethene (“PCE”), cis-
1,2-dichloroethene, 1,1-dichloroethene, 1,1-dichloroethane, vinyl chloride,
methylene chloride, bromodichloromethane, dibromochloromethane, and
1,1,1-trichloroethane.22
The concentrations of some of these pollutants were well beyond
what is considered safe for human contact, let alone ingestion. Dioxane, for
example, which damages the central nervous system, kidneys, and liver
and is a probable human carcinogen,23 has been found in concentrations
of 2,710 parts per billion (“ppb”), while the GCTL is 3.2 ppb.24 Even more
prevalent is TCE, which also damages the nervous system, kidneys, and
liver, as well as the immune system and developing fetuses and is a known
human carcinogen,25 found in concentrations of up to 35,000 ppb26—more
than 11,000 times Florida’s GCTL of 3.0 ppb and 7,000 times the Maxi-
mum Contaminant Level (“MCL”) under the Safe Drinking Water Act.27
Lockheed Martin maintains that it “immediately notified the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP)”28 upon discov-
ering the contamination in 2000, but neither Lockheed Martin nor FDEP
21 Id. at 5.
22 Id. at 9.
23 Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety and Health, 1,4-Dioxane, CTRS.’ FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL AND PREVENTION (last updated July 1, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ipcsneng
/neng0041.html [https://perma.cc/64BX-H828]; 1,4-Dioxane (1,4-Diethyleneoxide): Hazard
Summary—Created April 1992; Rev. January 2000, EPA (last updated Oct. 18, 2013),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/1-4-dioxane.pdf [https://
perma.cc/25FW-ST99].
24 Tallevast, Florida: Background & Timeline, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP., https://web.ar
chive.org/web/20160125122257/http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/tallevast/efforts
/background.html [https://perma.cc/2V5G-KD8T] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
25 Fact Sheet on Trichloroethylene (TCE), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-man
aging-chemicals-under-tsca/fact-sheet-trichloroethylene-tce [https://perma.cc/Z9BP-XT9K]
(last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
26 Tallevast, Florida: Background & Timeline, supra note 24.
27 42 U.S.C. § 300f–300j (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 141.61(a)(5) (2016) (MCL for TCE is 0.005
mg/l, or 5 ppb). The Maximum Contaminant Level Goal (“MCLG”) for TCE is zero (0). 40
C.F.R. § 141.50(a)(5) (2016).
28 Tallevast, Florida, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP., http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/talle
vast.html [https://perma.cc/K27D-GPGY] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
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notified the residents in the community. Initially, Lockheed believed the
groundwater contamination plume was limited to five acres in size and
did not extend beyond its property.29 At the time Lockheed Martin ac-
cepted responsibility for the clean-up by signing a consent order with
FDEP in 2004, the plume was then thought to be approximately twelve
acres.30 By 2006, however, when FDEP approved Lockheed Martin’s third
attempt at a Site Assessment Report, the plume of groundwater contami-
nation extended laterally over 200 acres and vertically down to three
distinct aquifer systems, composed of seven separate layers of aquifers.31
Tallevast residents did not find out about the contamination until
September 2003, when Laura Ward looked out her window to see a large
drilling rig in her yard. Ms. Ward asked a worker what they were doing
in her yard, and the worker responded: “You don’t know, but the water
is contaminated here.”32 Ms. Ward and other Tallevast resident started
asking a lot of questions of various government agencies and Lockheed
Martin officials. They were less than forthcoming at times, which led Ms.
Ward and Ms. Washington to do their own review of public records at the
Tampa office of FDEP. After these residents realized the extent of the
contamination, they were assured by FDEP and the County that the risk
of groundwater exposure was limited because the community was on
public water.33 While many Tallevast households were connected to public
water supply lines around 1985, the residences along 16th, 18th, and 19th
Streets, as well as parts of Tallevast Road, continued to use water from
their private wells for household uses and irrigation.34 When finally tested
in 2004, many of these wells were found to be contaminated.35
29 Id.
30 Consent Order, Fla. Dep’t Envtl. Prot. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., OGC #04-1328 (July 28,
2004); TETRA TECH, FINAL CONTAMINATION ASSESSMENT REPORT (CAR) 4–9 (May 2003).
31 Recommended Order, Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., No. 11-0259, at 3, 9–15 (Fla. Div. of Admin Hearings Oct. 6, 2011).
32 Ronnie Greene, Tiny Toxic Florida Town Takes on a Corporate Goliath, MIAMI HERALD
Aug. 15, 2010, at A1; Mary Ellen Klas, The toxic town that Florida forgot, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 16, 2010, http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2010/08/the-toxic-town-that
-florida-forgot.html; see generally STEVE LERNER, SACRIFICE ZONES: THE FRONT LINES OF
TOXIC CHEMICAL EXPOSURE IN THE UNITED STATES 157–76 (MIT Press ed. 2010) [https://
perma.cc/D8UL-K94K] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
33 Recommended Order, Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., No. 11-0259, at 6, 19 (Fla. Div. of Admin Hearings Oct. 6, 2011).
34 Id. at 6.
35 Id. at 6 (Fla. Div. of Admin Hearings Oct. 6, 2011); see also Joe Follick, ‘Tallevast’ Bill
Becomes Law: The State Must Give Notice if Contamination Threatens, SARASOTA HERALD-
TRIBUNE, May 25, 2005, at A1.
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B. Litigation and Other Legal Strategies
Although FDEP and Lockheed Martin began to hold informational
meetings in the community, the failure to inform the community about
the contamination made it difficult for the residents to trust or have con-
fidence in the responsible party or the government agency charged with
protecting Florida’s environment and the quality of life of its citizens.36
Looking for someone to protect their health and other interests, Tallevast
residents turned to private attorneys.
Almost from the beginning, litigation began to splinter this close-
knit community. Multiple tort suits with different sets of plaintiffs and
various claims were filed against Lockheed Martin. In terms of plaintiffs,
the largest suit, Laura Ward v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,37 in which 272
residents sought damages for contamination of their respective proper-
ties and intentional infliction of emotional distress for the failure to
notify the community, was filed in 2005. After five years of litigation,
Lockheed Martin announced the confidential settlement of an undis-
closed amount of damages in 2010, a month before the scheduled trial.38
Ultimately, the case was settled and dismissed at the end of 2011.39
Litigation concerning health impacts has proved even more diffi-
cult for the residents. A group of thirty-one residents, not parties to the
Ward litigation, also filed suit in 2005.40 Though the case included claims
similar to those of Ward, Alphonso Bradley v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
focused more on health damages.41 This case was eventually dismissed
in 2011.42
36 1993 Fla. Laws Ch. 93-213, at 2132–33.
37 Compl., Laura Ward. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Case No. 2005-CA-004707, at 1–4 (Fla.
12th Cir. Ct. Sept. 1, 2005).
38 See, e.g., Ward v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 8:05-CV-1878-T-17TGW, 2006 WL
889729 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2006) (order remand of case to state circuit court after Lockheed
Martin’s attempted removal to federal district court); Christopher O’Donnell, Settlement
is Likely in Tallevast Lawsuit, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Sept. 5, 2010 at B3 (announc-
ing Lockheed Martin’s press release about the settlement, community members declined
to comment).
39 Voluntary Dismissal, Laura Ward v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Case No. 2005-CA-004707
(Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. Dec. 20, 2011).
40 Compl., Bradley v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 2005-CA-005863, at 1 (Fla. 12th Cir.
Ct. Nov. 7, 2005).
41 Notice of Dismissal with Prejudice, Bradley v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 2005-CA-
005863 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. Aug. 31, 2011).
42 Id.
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In 2007, four community members filed a suit seeking class action
status for three groups of plaintiffs—employees, families of employees,
and residents of the community—for payment of medical monitoring
tests for conditions related to beryllium exposure, including berylliosis,
a lung disease, and the more severe chronic beryllium disease (“CBD”).43
Class-action status was denied in 2010 and upheld on appeal.44 Three
family members, the husband who was a janitor, his wife, and brother-in-
law who lived with them, each with berylliosis or CBD, also sued Lockheed
Martin in 2007 and settled for an undisclosed amount in 2011.45
The community’s litigation concerning the contamination, how-
ever, was not limited to Lockheed Martin. Unsatisfied with both the
documentation of the extent of pollution and the proposed pump-and-
treat methodology, which would take between 50 and 100 years to clean
up the groundwater, FOCUS and several individual residents challenged
FDEP’s approval of Lockheed Martin’s Site Assessment Report (“SAR”)
and Remedial Action Plan (“RAP”) in 2011.46 After an eleven-day admin-
istrative hearing, the administrative law judge ruled against the Peti-
tioners, a recommendation that was approved by FDEP.47 After more
than two years, the Court of Appeals upheld this decision in a one-word
opinion.48 FOCUS’s other challenges to the decisions of FDEP and the
water management district allowing Lockheed to proceed with its clean-
up plan also proved unsuccessful.49
43 Compl., Wanda Washington v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 07-CA-4765 (Fla. 12th Cir.
Ct. July 21, 2007).
44 Case Destroyed, Wanda Washington v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 2D10-4298 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App., July 24, 2013); Timothy R. Wolfrum, Judge: No Class Action in Tallevast,
BRADENTON HERALD (Sept. 2, 2010).
45 Compl., Beatrice Zeigler v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 07-CA-4491 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct.
July 12, 2007); Proposed J. Stip. For Dismissal with Prejudice, Beatrice Zeigler v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., No. 07-CA-4491 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. May 25, 2011).
46 Final Order, Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
No. 11-0259, 2012 WL 36239 at 1 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings. Jan. 3, 2012).
47 Id.
48 Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t Envtl. Prot., 145 So. 3d 833
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (The entire opinion is as follows: “AFFIRMED”).
49 See, e.g., Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t Envtl. Prot., 78 So.
3d 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“Affirmed.”); Family Oriented Comm. United Strong,
Inc. v. Dep’t Envtl. Prot., 60 So. 3d 1061 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (denial of writ
petition for injunctive relief); Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Dep’t Envtl.
Prot., No: 11-01407 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings. 2011) (voluntary dismissal of petition
challenging removal of concrete slab serving as a contamination cap following actual
removal of said slab); Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp. and SW Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 12-0546 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings. 2012)
(voluntary dismissal of consumptive use permit).
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C. Other Environmental Hazards Threatening the Community
The groundwater contamination and resulting litigation have not
been the only environmental threats to Tallevast. The County Commis-
sion decided that Tallevast should also host the new Manatee County
Transit Authority bus depot.50 The 116,000-square-foot, $16-million
facility is to include a maintenance building, fuel depot, and truck wash
station and will host buses, trolleys, ambulances, tractors, bulldozers,
sheriff’s vehicles, boats, vans, and mowers.51 Residents are most con-
cerned about the increased traffic and fumes. As summarized by Wanda
Washington at a County Commission meeting, “This is not the correct
project to bring to this community and it seems as though nobody’s hear-
ing us.”52 Laura Ward added:
“Our families were in that community when no one else
wanted to be out there. . . . Manatee County never gave us
lights, they never gave you a phone number,” she said, add-
ing residents still have trouble getting mail unless they
use a Sarasota ZIP code. . . . “We don’t want any foolish-
ness like this in our community.”53
In addition to the transit facility, Manatee County approved the
demolition of a building on another contaminated site in 2015.54 This
building was previously part of the ABC facility, “until it became too
contaminated for the workers, then they moved them next door” to the
current Lockheed Martin property.55 Although community members have
wanted this vacant, dilapidated eyesore removed for years, they had fre-
quently been told that the property was too contaminated to tear down.56
As such, residents were concerned about beryllium dust, asbestos, and
other toxins being further distributed in the community. The first any of
the Tallevast residents learned of the planned removal, however, was
when they saw news stories about Manatee County’s approval.57
50 Sara Kennedy, Manatee County’s New Transit Fleet Facility Slated for Tallevast,
BRADENTON HERALD, May 17, 2014.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Wanda Washington, pers. comm. (2015).
55  Id.
56 Id.
57 See Sara Kennedy, Part of Abandoned Tallevast Plant to be Demolished, Manatee
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II. PROCEDURAL DEFICITS IN FLORIDA’S ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
Florida is one of the most contaminated states in the country,
currently ranking sixth in the number of Superfund sites on the National
Priorities List (“NPL”).58 Within Florida, these Superfund hazardous
waste sites are nearly four times more likely to be located in a community
of color than a white community and are unequally distributed by income
and education levels as well.59 Other general indicators of environmental
burdens in Florida—such as cancer risk from hazardous air pollutants,
facilities emitting criteria pollutants, and the release of toxic chemi-
cals—also show disproportionate impacts based on race, class, and edu-
cation.60 Thus, Florida’s structural decisions concerning the participation
of citizens directly impacted by these environmental burdens have powerful
procedural justice implications. Florida, unfortunately, has a history of
decision-making processes that not only exclude the affected public from
effective participation but also from receiving basic information on en-
vironmental risks they may face.
A. Notification Rules for Residents When Their Property Has Been
Contaminated: The “Tallevast” Bill
When Lockheed Martin began initial clean-up of the ABC site in
2001 with the removal of 538 tons of contaminated soil,61 Florida law did
not require notifying residents whose property was contaminated by an-
other party until after FDEP had approved a clean-up plan.62 At that time,
FDEP approval was the last step of a process that began with FDEP
being made aware of contamination spreading onto adjacent properties
followed by a formal assessment of the extent of contamination.63
County Official Says, BRADENTON HERALD (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.bradenton.com
/news/local/article34793730.html.
58 Final National Priorities List (NPL) Sites—by State, EPA (last updated Apr. 12, 2016),
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/query/queryhtm/nplfin.htm [https://perma.cc/3L2U
-SNSG] (Florida contains 53 of 1,328 sites).
59 Environmental Justice Summary Report: Florida, GOOD GUIDE SCORECARD, http://
scorecard.goodguide.com/community/ej-summary.tcl?fips_state_code=12&backlink=tri
-st#hotspots [https://perma.cc/NM6D-J537] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
60 Id.
61 Ronnie Greene, Taking the Law Into Their Own Hands: Fence Line Fighting and Environ-
mental Justice, a Journalist’s Point of View, 2 ENVT’L AND EARTH L. J. 60, 74 (2012).
62 See, e.g., Editorial, Lessons of Tallevast: DEP Plan Overlooks Community’s Experience
with Contamination, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, July 29, 2004, at A14.
63 Id.
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In Tallevast’s case, FDEP publicly asserted at the time that the
agency was unaware that residents in Tallevast continued to use private
wells, rather than a public water system, because of poor state record-
keeping and inadequate interagency communication.64 Nearly a decade
later, however, an investigative reporter’s review of FDEP records from
2001 and 2002, found the State believed organic compounds “may be
migrating offsite” and that government officials “raised concerns about
potential impacts to off-site private wells.”65 The notification delay for
Tallevast and the residents’ anger at FDEP created an ally in State
Representative Bill Galvano (R-Bradenton), despite Tallevast not being
included in his Manatee County district.66 Representative Galvano called
FDEP’s failure “abhorrent” and recognized that “[t]he community had a
complete lack of trust at that point, and you could not blame them.”67
Publicly embarrassed by the situation in Tallevast, FDEP initi-
ated rulemaking to require notification of contamination in 2004 and
adopted its first notification rule in April 2005.68 This rule required a
responsible party to notify FDEP within ten days of discovering contami-
nation beyond the boundaries of its property.69 It further required that
the responsible party provide actual notice to “the appropriate County
Health Department and all record owners of any real property into which
[contamination above CTL[s] extend[ed],” as well as constructive notice
to residents by publication in a newspaper and posting warning signs at
the site.70 While these notifications had to be made prior to FDEP autho-
rizing the responsible party’s final remediation plan, specific time frames
during which these notifications must be provided were not required.71
After the rule went into effect, for example, FDEP estimated it would
take about one year to notify all the residents living near approximately
2,500 sites where the contamination had spread to adjacent properties.72
The rule adopted by FDEP had a number of deficiencies, but the
lack of a firm deadline for notifying residents of affected properties led
64 See, e.g., Follick, supra note 35.
65 Greene, supra note 61 (citing Ronnie Greene, Small-town Residents Living on Deadly
Ground, MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 2008; Ronnie Greene, Tiny Toxic Florida Town Takes on
a Corporate Goliath, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 15, 2010).
66 Ronnie Greene, Village’s Residents Live on Deadly Turf, THE LEDGER, May 11, 2008,
at A1.
67  Id.
68 Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 62-780.220 (2005) (adopted Apr. 17, 2005).
69 Id. r. 62-780.220(2).
70 Id. r. 62-780.220(3), (5).
71 See id. r. 62-780.220(3).
72 Follick, supra note 35.
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Representative Galvano to pursue legislation requiring FDEP to provide
notices to affected property owners within a specific time frame.73 Galvano
did not want public notification to be “left to [FDEP] discretion.”74 The
“Tallevast” bill, as House Bill 937 was known, eventually passed unani-
mously.75 The statute required FDEP, not the responsible party, to notify
all owners of property at which contamination had been discovered
within thirty days after FDEP became aware of the contamination.76
“The idea that government had knowledge about [residents’] safety
that wasn’t being shared, that’s hard for a community to overcome,”77
Galvano said. Wanda Washington said she was “happy that Tallevast was
instrumental in helping other people, but. . . [n]ow that the pollution is
here, we’re focusing on our health.”78
B. Inadequate Technical Assistance and Patchwork Attempts to
Address the Knowledge Gap
At the federal level, Congress made well-informed citizen partici-
pation an important part of hazardous waste site clean-ups under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”).79 Under CERCLA, for example, EPA may pro-
vide technical assistance grants (“TAGs”) of up to $50,000 to groups of
individuals which may be affected by contaminants from a facility on the
NPL.80 TAGs allow communities to obtain technical assistance for “inter-
preting information with regard to the nature of the hazard, remedial
investigation and feasibility study, record of decision, remedial design,
selection and construction of remedial action, operation and mainte-
nance, or removal action.”81 The grants may be “renewed to facilitate
public participation at all stages of remedial action,” and EPA may waive
73 Editorial, Give Public Fair Notice: Legislature Should Set Deadline for Reporting Con-
tamination, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Feb. 28, 2005, at A12.
74 Neil Santaniello, Owners of Fouled Land to Get Letter, SUN SENTINEL, Apr. 18, 2005,
at B1.
75 2005 Fla. Laws 937.
76 FLA. STAT. § 376.30702(3) (2005).
77 Follick, supra note 35.
78 Id.
79 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012). See also Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and
Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Expanding Public Participation in the Federal Superfund
Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 671, 671–72 (1994).
80 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e) (2012) (originally enacted in 1983).
81 Id. § 9617(e)(1).
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the $50,000 limit for sites that are complex or generate a large volume
of information.82
Lockheed Martin’s ABC facility, however, was not being cleaned
up pursuant to the authority of CERCLA. Instead, it would become the
first contaminated site remediated under the State of Florida’s new
global risk-based corrective action (“RBCA”) law, which became effective
in 200383 and extended RBCA principles established for the petroleum,
brownfields, and drycleaning programs “to all contaminated sites” where
responsible parties have been identified.84 In general, application of RBCA
principles has been embraced by the regulated community “as a stream-
lined approach that offers a more cost-efficient cleanup process.”85
Unlike CERCLA, however, public involvement is not an integral
part of the State of Florida’s hazardous waste remediation program.
Other than notification of contamination, public participation in Florida
is required to include only a 30-day comment period for local govern-
ments and owners and residents of property into which contaminants
exceeding GCTLs extend.86
1. Insufficient Technical Assistance and the 2004 Consent Order
Although community technical assistance is not required under
Florida law, due to the urging of Representative Galvano, the 2004 Consent
Order included a provision requiring Lockheed Martin to “fund the over-
sight and review activities of an independent consulting firm chosen by
the Tallevast community group called Family Oriented Community United
Strong (FOCUS).”87 The Consent Order also required that any data
Lockheed Martin presented to the State “must be submitted to FOCUS
at the same time they are submitted to [FDEP].”88 In addition, FDEP was
also to “consider any comments provided by FOCUS concerning any data
reviewed by the consulting firm” provided for in the Consent Order.89
82 Id. § 9617(e)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 35.4065 (2016).
83 FLA. STAT. § 376.30701 (2016) (originally enacted in 2003).
84 Id. § 376.30701(1).
85 SUBCOMM. ON AGRIC. & ENVTL. APPROPRIATIONS, H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, HB 1123 W/CS
SITE REHABILITATION, H.R. 108-1123, at 2 (Fla. 2003).
86 FLA. STAT. § 376.30701(2)(b)–(d); FLA. STAT. § 376.301(45) (“Temporary point of com-
pliance means the boundary represented by one or more designated monitoring wells at
which [GCTLs] may not be exceeded . . .”).
87 Amend. to Consent Order at GW/CO/0999.2, Fla. Dep’t Envtl. Prot. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., OGC No. 04-1328, (Fla. Dep’t. Of Envtl. Prot. Sept. 21, 2004), https://www.doah
.state.fl.us/FLAID/DEP/2004/DEP_04-1328_07012015_113253.pdf.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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While intentions may have been good, the technical assistance
provisions for FOCUS in the Consent Order proved problematic to im-
plement. First, it committed Lockheed to funding activities of FOCUS’s
consulting firm “up to a maximum of $25,000 per year” for as long as the
contamination plume extended beyond the ABC site.90 This amount was
established, however, at the time the plume was believed to be twelve
acres in size, and the amount was never adjusted when the size of the
plume was found to be more than sixteen times larger.91 Moreover, the
Tallevast site is hydrologically complex and involves multiple pollut-
ants.92 Thus, Lockheed Martin has produced a staggering volume of data,
including quarterly and annual reports from 275 monitoring wells, four
SARs, and multiple RAPs.93
Second, the Consent Order provides that “FOCUS shall direct
activities of the independent consulting firm,” but it does not state who
would pay the firm directly.94 As a result, Lockheed Martin has paid the
consultant’s invoices directly, and has never provided FOCUS with an
accounting of how much money was spent and on what activities.95 If
FOCUS wanted the consultant to spend time on something specific,
Lockheed Martin would frequently inform the organization that the
$25,000 had already been expended for the year.96 Finally, although the
Consent Order afforded FDEP, but not Lockheed Martin, the right to
approve FOCUS’s choice of a consulting firm, FDEP has allowed Lockheed
Martin to veto FOCUS’s requests to use consultants other than the firm
initially selected.97
FOCUS had no ability to address these deficiencies without the
willingness of both FDEP and Lockheed Martin to reopen the Consent
Order. On August 3, 2008, however, Lockheed’s Interim RAP groundwater
90 Id.
91 TETRA TECH, supra note 30, at 4–9.
92 Id. at 2–7.
93 See Recommended Order at 2, 11, Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., No. 11-0259 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings Oct. 6, 2011) (providing a summary
of various documents Lockheed Martin has filed with the Fla. Dep’t Envtl. Prot.).
94 Amend. to Consent Order, supra note 87, at GW/CO/0999.2.
95 Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Jury Orders Lockheed to Pay $3M to Fla. Community Group,
LAW360 (Dec. 3, 2012 7:31 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/398431/jury--orders--lock
heed-pay-3m-to-fla-community-group.
96 Court records eventually showed that Lockheed Martin well exceeded the $20,000 in
many years. Family Oriented Comm. See United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
No. 8:11-CV-217-T-30AEP, 2011 WL 8192221, at 1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2012).
97 First Amend. Compl., Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., No. 8:11-CV-217-T-30AEP, 2011 WL 8192221, at 10–11 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2011).
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treatment system failed, spilling 5,000 gallons of contaminated water
onto the site and adjacent properties,98 including the Tallevast Commu-
nity Center, a youth development organization providing after-school care
for children.99 The leak occurred less than two weeks after a community
meeting in which Lockheed assured the residents that “state-of-the-art
‘double-redundancy’ safety protocols” would prevent such a problem.100
2. FOCUS’s Technical Consulting Agreement with
Lockheed Martin
FOCUS and Lockheed Martin began negotiations to address the
worry, anger, and distrust the spill caused in the community.101 These
discussions included Lockheed providing FOCUS funds to procure inde-
pendent testing and monitoring data in the community as well as includ-
ing such a provision in the new Consent Order for the August spill.102
When this funding and other issues discussed were not included in the
Consent Order, however, FOCUS petitioned for an administrative hear-
ing to challenge FDEP’s approval of said Order.103 After FOCUS filed the
Petition, however, Lockheed Martin suggested making its relationship
with FOCUS more direct without involving FDEP in additional technical
consulting funds.104 These conversations led to a Technical Consulting
Agreement (“TCA”) between Lockheed Martin and FOCUS, which was
entered into in January 2009.105
In exchange for FOCUS dismissing the challenge to the spill
Consent Order and taking on additional specified duties, Lockheed Martin
promised to provide FOCUS with monies to fund independent environ-
mental consulting, environmental, health, and safety monitoring, and
98 Amend. to Consent Order, supra note 87, ¶¶ 6–7; Gary Taylor, Tallevast Water Treat-
ment Leaks, NUCLEAR AND INDIGENOUS ITEMS OF INTEREST ¶ 5 (Aug. 4, 2008), https://
gregornot.wordpress.com/2008/08/04/tallevast-water-treatment-leaks/.
99 Gary Taylor, supra note 98, ¶ 5.
100 First Amend. Compl., Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin,
¶ 32.
101 Christopher O’Donnell, Tallevast Cleanup Stalls After Leak, SARASOTA HERALD-
TRIBUNE, Aug. 5, 2008, at B3.
102 First Amend. Compl., Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., ¶¶ 35, 39.
103 Consent Order, Fla. Dep’t Envtl. Prot. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., at 8; FLA. STAT.
§§ 120.569, 120.57.
104 First Amend. Compl., Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin,
at 1, 6.
105 Id. at 6.
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community organizing related to the contamination.106 The amount of
funds varied based on status of remediation at the site. At the time of the
agreement, for example, Lockheed Martin was to provide FOCUS ap-
proximately $550,000 per year until RAP construction was completed.
After construction, the amount of funds decreased until remediation
ended and Lockheed Martin received a “no further action” approval from
FDEP.107 Based on Lockheed Martin’s estimated RAP construction and
48 to 100-year clean-up time frames, the value of the Agreement to
FOCUS would have been between $5 and $17 million.108
After making the first payment of $275,000 in July 2009, how-
ever, Lockheed stopped making payments to FOCUS.109 Initially, follow-
ing an audit of FOCUS’s finances, Lockheed Martin claimed FOCUS had
breached its duties under the TCA.110 After FOCUS addressed the issues
raised by Lockheed Martin, virtually all of which required actions beyond
the terms of the TCA, however, Lockheed Martin ultimately stated that
the TCA was a “gift” to FOCUS which Lockheed Martin was no longer
interested in continuing.111
After sending demand letters, FOCUS filed a breach of contract
suit in January 2011. After a 4-day jury trial in November 2012, FOCUS
received a directed verdict on formation and breach of contract.112 The
question of damages suffered by FOCUS went to the jury, which awarded
$3 million in damages—$1.75 million of the payments Lockheed Martin
had not made and $1.25 million for future economic loss.113 By the end of
the trial, however, because RAP construction was nearly complete and
the court had been unwilling to enjoin construction activities over a
contract dispute, FOCUS had lost the opportunity to collect the most
important data for the residents’ long-term health concerns—air moni-
toring during demolition of beryllium-contaminated buildings, removing
106 Id. ¶ 44.
107 Id. at 3–4.
108 Id. at 4–8.
109 Id. at 3–4.
110 First Amend. Compl., Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin,
at 9.
111 D. Lockheed Martin Corp.’s Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Family Oriented
Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 8:11-CV-217-T-30AEP, 2012
WL 1982079 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2012).
112 Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin, at 1.
113 Order, Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 8:11-
CV-217-T-30AEP, 2012 WL 6575348, at 1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2012); Judgment in a Civil
Case, Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 8:11-
CV-217-T-30AEP, 2012 WL 6677147 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2012).
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existing caps over the groundwater contamination, and soil disturbance
from digging trenches and other infrastructure during RAP construc-
tion.114 Nonetheless, because the other residents’ legal challenges ended
in undisclosed settlements or were unsuccessful, this has proven to be
the only litigation the community has filed where a court actually found
that Lockheed Martin violated the law—albeit contract, rather than en-
vironmental, law.115
3. Community Health Assessment
In addition to the difficulties Tallevast residents have had gathering
technical information, finding a reliable source able to document the
health impacts on the community has further been a challenge. In 2005,
Lockheed Martin, insisting that the contamination posed no health risks,
began their own toxicology study, as did the Florida Department of
Health (“DOH”) and the federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (“ATSDR”).116 Meanwhile, community residents, through FOCUS,
took a door-to-door approach, and began compiling information on resi-
dents’ health,117 with the assistance of graduate student interns from the
Florida A&M University Institute of Public Health.118 By 2008, these
health studies resulted in another embarrassment for the State govern-
ment and more frustration for the community.119
The Florida DOH’s cancer study, which utilized the Florida Cancer
Data System, revealed only four cases of cancer in Tallevast.120 This re-
sult contrasted starkly to the residents’ study—which included tracking
cancers and beryllium-related diseases with pushpins on a wall map—
that showed more than eighty cancer deaths in the previous twenty
years.121 The ATSDR’s conclusions also contradicted those of the Florida
DOH. Regarding the groundwater in Tallevast, the ATSDR declared it
114 Order, Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 8:11-
CV-217-T-30AEP, Dkt. No. 30 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2011) (Order denying plaintiff’s TRO).
115 Beth Barrett et al., Lockheed Resolves Toxic Claims, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Aug. 4, 1996,
http://chipjacobs.com/articles/environmental/lockheed-resolves-toxic-claims/.
116 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., ATSDR, PUBLIC HEALTH ASSESSMENT FOR
FORMER AM. BERYLLIUM CO., TALLEVAST, MANATEE CTY., FLA. 4 (2008).
117 Christopher O’Donnell, State Messes Up Tallevast Study, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE,
Mar. 25, 2008, at B1.
118 Fran T. Close et al., Community-Based Internships to Address Environmental Issues:
A Model for Effective Partnerships, 5 PROG. CMTY. HEALTH P’SHIP 77–87 (2011).
119 O’Donnell, supra note 117, at B1.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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“a public health hazard. Past long-term use of groundwater with the
highest measured trichloroethylene concentrations for drinking and
showering by Tallevast residents could have resulted in . . . increased theo-
retical risk of kidney cancer, liver cancer, leukemia, and lymphoma.”122
The problem with the DOH study, as it turned out, was the result
of tracking cancer deaths reported in the wrong ZIP code. Although
Tallevast has its own postal ZIP code, very few residents are able to use
its ZIP code because the U.S. Postal Service does not deliver mail in the
community.123 Thus, most Tallevast residents have P.O. boxes or are
otherwise assigned a ZIP code for the neighboring County.124 The commu-
nity was upset that DOH had not worked with them to ensure errors like
this did not occur. Wanda Washington was “angry. . . . [N]o one ever
came into the community to do a study. If you are doing it from behind
a desk, you’re going to miss a lot.”125
DOH estimated that conducting an official epidemiological study
like the residents’ informal one would cost $125,000.126 With that estimate,
Representative Galvano ensured there was a line item in the state budget
for that amount earmarked for a Tallevast health study.127 Rather than
just allow DOH to conduct the study, however, the allocation called for
a three-year grant under which DOH would provide FOCUS the funds to
hire an independent epidemiologist, with DOH maintaining oversight.128
With the initial grant, FOCUS hired Dr. Janvier Gasana, a tenured
associate professor at Florida International University Robert Stempel
College of Public Health & Social Work, who spent several weekends in
the community conducting face-to-face interviews and reviewing medical
records of more than 150 residents.129 Dr. Gasana’s initial reports demon-
strated some startling results. For example:
The age-specific incidence of cancers of concern in Tallevast
was more than 2 times as high as what is expected if
Tallevast residents had experienced the same incidence rate
as the Florida African American population for prostate
122 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., ATSDR, supra note 116, at 1.
123 O’Donnell, supra note 117, at B1.
124 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., ATSDR, supra note 116, at 120–21.
125 Id.
126 O’Donnell, supra note 117, at B1.
127 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., ATSDR, supra note 116, at 120–21.
128 Id. at 70.
129 See Toni Whitt, A Weary, Ailing Tallevast Welcomes Spotlight, BRADENTON HERALD,
Apr. 3, 2011.
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cancer. The overall cancer incidence among Tallevast
residents was 85% higher than among the Florida African
Americans. Using the raw numbers, there seems to be an
increase of cancers three decades after the start of the
chemical plant.130
Upon receiving the draft report, DOH began questioning Dr.
Gasana’s methodology.131 FOCUS had an independent expert review Dr.
Gasana’s draft report, who found the methodology acceptable.132 Since
neither Dr. Gasana nor FOCUS were willing to change the methodology
or analysis, DOH refused any further payments to FOCUS, leaving FO-
CUS unable to pay Dr. Gasana and his team.133 Further, FOCUS was left
with a comprehensive health study of the community that, if it were ever
to be released, would not have the official stamp of government approval
Tallevast had desired.
C. Local Government Procedures
At the federal level, if a government agency undertakes “major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment,”134 it is required to prepare an environmental impact statement
(“EIS”) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).135
Public involvement is an integral part of NEPA, which has the “twin
aims” of informed agency decision-making and ensuring an informed
public.136 The initial stage of the NEPA process includes scoping, an
“early and open process for determining the scope of issues to be ad-
dressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a proposed
action.”137 Since the scoping process requires federal agencies to actively
seek the participation of the public, scoping serves as an early notice
130 Janvier Gasana, Health Study of Tallevast Community: Summary of Study Findings,
FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH (2015) (on file with author).
131 See Toni Whitt, Lockheed’s Tallevast cleanup plan on trial, BRADENTON HERALD,
June 29, 2011.
132 Sources on file with author.
133 Sources on file with author.
134 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (2012). Agencies may prepare a more concise environmental assess-
ment (“EA”) to determine the impacts of its action are “significant” and thus requiring a
full EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a) (2016).
135 42 U.S.C. § 4321. (2012).
136 See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97
(1983).
137 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2016).
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system for informing the public of the government’s intent to pursue a
specific project.
At least fifteen states have adopted “mini-NEPA” statutes that vary
in restraints on state agency action,138 though “[m]ost include similar pro-
cedural provisions as NEPA.”139 In states such as Florida that do not have
such a statute, however, public notification of the state or local govern-
ment’s intent to pursue a project can come well after bureaucratic inertia
has set in. In addition, the most proximate tier of government for many is
the county. These unincorporated areas have often been overlooked by
municipal annexation because the “properties offer[ing] lower tax revenues
or residents considered undesirable through the lens of racial prejudice.”140
Thus, for citizens who want to be involved in government decision-making
processes, a “county government may present special limitations.”141
1. Land Use Decisions That Encourage Encroaching
Industrial Uses
In 1980, the Manatee County Board of County Commissioners
adopted The Manatee Plan,142 the County’s first comprehensive plan re-
quired by Florida’s Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of
1975.143 The plan designated the future land uses in the Tallevast area
as mixed residential containing one-, two-, and multiple-family homes.144
This designation allowed neighborhood commerce, offices, and agricul-
tural uses as secondary uses that served as support to the primary resi-
dential use, but other forms of commerce, light and heavy industrial, and
heavy transportation uses were prohibited as inconsistent with Talle-
vast’s residential characteristics.145 As such, The Manatee Plan sought to
138 See David Sive & Mark A. Chertok, Little NEPA’s and the Environmental Impact
Assessment Procedures, ALI-ABA: ENVTL. LITIGATION, 25–26 (2005).
139 Kenneth S. Weiner, NEPA and State NEPAs: Learning from the Past, Foresight for the
Future, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,675, 10,677 (2009).
140 Anderson, supra note 11, at 1143.
141 Id. at 1145.
142 See MANATEE CNTY., FLA., ORDINANCE 80-4 (Nov. 14, 1980) [hereinafter The Manatee
Plan].
143 FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161–163.3211 (1980). This comprehensive planning act has been
amended several times since its passage, and been called the Community Planning Act
since 2011. See, e.g., Act of May 31, 1965, §§ 1, 20, ch. 85-55 (“Local Government Compre-
hensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act”); Act of May 11, 1993, ch. 93-
206; Act of June 2, 2011, § 4 ch. 2011-139 (“Community Planning Act”) (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 163.3161).
144 Id. pt. 4 at 14, 20 (Fig. 4–6) (Tallevast Sector designated as MIX-1).
145 See id. pt. 4 at 6, 23.
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protect the Tallevast Community “from industrial encroachment,” a basis
which the County used to support their application for a Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) Community Development
Block Grant (“CDBG”).146
Awarded in 1983, the County used this $1 million federal grant
to install a sewage collection system, connect residences to county water,
pave most of the unpaved roads in the community, provide fire hydrants,
and help bring substandard residences up to code through grants and low
interest loans.147 By 1985, concerns about expending the CDBG funds in
a timely manner led to the County utilizing “quick-taking” condemnation
proceedings to acquire fee simple title and the easements required to
widen and pave the roads and provide water and sewer connections.148
Nonetheless, while the roads were paved, not all of the residences were
connected to the County’s sewer and water systems by the completion of
the HUD grant.149
Within a few years of these residential improvements, however,
Manatee County began procedures to revise its comprehensive plan.150
While the revised comprehensive plan, which was formally adopted in 1989,
maintained a residential designation for most of the existing Tallevast
community, it allocated all of the areas adjacent to the community to light
or heavy industrial uses.151 In addition, approximately half of the commu-
nity was designated as light industrial, despite the fact that it contained
only occupied residential homes.152 Thus, rather than protecting the area
from industrial encroachment, Manatee County began the process of en-
couraging industrial activity adjacent to this historic African American
community. Most of this adjacent land that was designated as industrial
remained vacant for twenty-five years.153 This revised comprehensive
146 See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Manatee Cnty., Fla., Manatee County Small Cities Com-
munity Development Block Grant Application (HUD Form 4124), pt. I, ¶ 7 (Nov. 4, 1982)
[hereinafter CDBG Application] (copy on file with author); HUD, CDBG No. B-82-DH-12-
0105 (Feb. 15, 1983).
147 CDBG Application, supra note 146, at pt. II.
148 MANATEE CNTY., FLA., RESOLUTION 85-73 (Apr. 9, 1985).
149 Bryce & Debi Springer, supra note 15.
150 See, e.g., PLANNING COMM’N, MANATEE CNTY., FLA., RESOLUTION 88–185 (Aug. 22, 1988)
(after several public hearings, recommending adoption of revised comprehensive plan for
approval by the Board of County Commissioners).
151 MANATEE CNTY., FLA., ORDINANCE 89-01, MANATEE CNTY. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, pt. 2
at 65 (Sheet 19) (May 11, 1989) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE PLAN].
152 Id., pt. 2.
153 Id.
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plan has been amended more than 290 times since its adoption in 1989.154
While some of these amendments did apportion additional lands to resi-
dential uses along Tallevast Road, these changes occurred solely on the
east side of U.S. 301, the side of the highway where the population is
primarily white, and not adjacent to the Tallevast Community.155
From the late 1980s to the present, on the other hand, Manatee
County’s vision for the future of the Tallevast Community has continued
to be one of an island of low to moderate income, almost entirely African
American, residences surrounded by a sea of industrial uses.156 The
County had proposed various improvement projects for Tallevast over the
years, but few came to fruition. For example, a proposal to expand the
two-lane road through the Community to three lanes, with turn lanes,
landscaped medians, a six-foot-wide sidewalk, and a four-foot-wide bicycle
lane along both sides of the road was tabled by the County Commission-
ers in 1999.157 The County Commission did set aside design funds for a
similar proposal in 2003 and the community received a $180,000 CDBG
toward the design and engineering of road paving and water and sewer
connections that were not completed in 1985.158 Any construction activity,
however, came to a halt once the contamination was discovered.159
2. When Encouragement Was Not Enough, the County Finally
Brought Industrial Activity into the Community
On December 11, 2012, the Board of County Commissioners for
Manatee County held a vote on purchasing 37.7 acres at the corner of
154 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, COMPLETE AND UP TO DATE THRU SUPPLEMENT #22 A.2 (Dec. 16,
2014), https://www.mymanatee.org/home/government/departments/building-and-devel
opment-services/planning-zoning/comprehensive-planning-section/comprehensive-plan
.html [https://perma.cc/E9PD-H22B]; PROGRAM IMPACT REPORT (July 6, 2006), https://de
velopment.ohio.gov/files/is/HWAPimpactEvaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY5G-S7G6]
(The use of a report predating the Ohio AEPS is intended to demonstrate the impact of
this program without the larger regulatory scheme in place, and to more closely parallel
the Oregon report cited).
155 MANATEE CNTY., FLA., ORDINANCE 89-01, MANATEE CNTY. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, pt. 2
at 65 (Sheet 19) (May 11, 1989)
156 See COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, COMPLETE AND UP TO DATE THRU SUPPLEMENT #22 A.2, at
Future Land Use Map 25 of 29.
157 Erin Bryce, Tallevast Improvements, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 6, 2003, at H1.
158 Id.
159 Debi Springer, Tallevast county puts a halt to permits The county goes along with their
request for a moratorium, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, (Dec. 8, 2004, 4:23 AM), http://www
.heraldtribune.com/news/20041208/tallevast-residents-put-a-halt-to-permits-the-county
-goes-along-with-their-request--for-a-moratorium.
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Tallevast Road and U.S. 301 for the location of the county’s new Transit
Fleet Facility, or bus depot.160 The Commission was originally scheduled
to vote on the purchase while FOCUS was in court for the TCA, but the
Commission agreed to delay the vote for a week to allow the community
leaders to attend.161 Community members spoke out against the bus depot
in their community, saying they have already suffered enough from pollu-
tion and feared a depot will add more. “You’re talking about diesel fuels,
you’re talking about everything that Lockheed brought except beryllium.”162
Residents also asked whether the Tallevast site was the only place it
could go and questioned why no one had approached neighbors to discuss
the plan in advance of placing the vote on the Commission’s agenda.163
By the time the community learned of the plans, Manatee County
had already secured $15.9 million in funding for the facility from the
Federal Transit Authority (“FTA”). Although Manatee County had origi-
nally identified a different location in its State of Good Repair Grant ap-
proved by the FTA, negotiations on that site quickly broke down and
Manatee County decided to move those efforts to the Tallevast site.164
Under the FTA’s NEPA regulations, any applicant for funds “shall serve
as a joint lead agency with the [FTA].”165 Manatee County completed the
NEPA documentation for the transit facility, which it represented to be
categorically excluded from NEPA,166 in May 2012.167 Since NEPA regula-
tions do not require public participation in categorically excluded actions,168
the County’s decision not to prepare an environmental assessment or an
160 Sara Kennedy, Manatee County to Buy Tellevast Land for Bus Depot, BRADENTON
HERALD, Dec. 11, 2012.
161 Sara Kennedy, Manatee Commissioners to Consider $4.52 Million Land Buy for Transit
Depot, BRADENTON HERALD, Dec. 10, 2012.
162 Christopher O’Donnell, County Buying Tallevast Site for Bus Depot, SARASOTA HERALD-
TRIBUNE, Dec. 13, 2012, at B3 (statement of Wanda Washington).
163 Kennedy, supra note 160.
164 Letter from Yvette Taylor, Reg’l Adm’r, FTA, to Ron Schulhofer, Public Works Dir.,
Manatee Cty. (Oct. 28, 2011) (on file with author).
165 23 C.F.R. § 771.109(c)(2) (2016).
166 The FTA has an established categorical exclusion for “[c]onstruction of new bus
storage and maintenance facilities in areas used predominantly for industrial or trans-
portation purposes where such construction is not inconsistent with existing zoning and
located on or near a street with adequate capacity to handle anticipated bus and support
vehicle traffic.” 23 C.F.R. § 771.117(d)(8).
167 See id.; Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Manatee Cty., Fla., State of Good Repair Grant 5309—
Information Required for Probable Categorical Exclusion (May 1, 2012).
168 Compare 23 C.F.R. § 771.118 (FTA requirements for categorical exclusions) with 23
C.F.R. §§ 771.119, § 771.121 (FTA requirements for environmental assessments) and 23
C.F.R. §§ 771.123–771.130 (FTA requirements for environmental impact statements).
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environmental impact statement meant the agencies completed their as-
sessment of the environmental impacts of the project six months before
the residents living less than a half-mile from the property even knew
about the County’s plans.
Despite the local opposition, the Commission voted unanimously
to purchase the Tallevast property for $4.52 million.169 The Commission
assured the community “the facility would be ‘green’ and would not be a
nuisance to its Tallevast neighbors.”170 Commissioner Carol Whitmore
seemed to believe she was acting in the community’s best interest, stating
that the bus depot would be less disruptive than other possible develop-
ments. “We were protecting [the property] from becoming a more heavy
industrial site,” she said.171 “They’re not facing the prospect of having a
cement plant in the future,”172 despite the existing zoning for the land not
allowing such a heavy industrial use.173 The County’s project manager
said, “It’s going to be a nice-looking facility. . . . [t]he county’s going to be
very proud of it.”174
When the final vote for construction approval arrived in October
2014, Manatee County officials held the public meeting not in Tallevast,
but the neighboring county.175 The public input portion of the meeting was
limited to residents writing down their concerns on comment forms that
were distributed at the beginning of the meeting.176 As Laura Ward stated:
“This is the wrong project for this community and we’ve expressed that
from the very beginning . . . and it seems as though nobody’s hearing us.”177
3. Contaminated Building Demolition
In addition to the ABC facility and the Transit Facility on the
eastern edge of the community, Tallevast residents sought for years to
169 Kennedy, supra note 160.
170 Id.
171 O’Donnell, supra note 162.
172 Id.
173 In 2010, the County Commission rezoned the parcel located at 2411 Tallevast Road
from A-1 (Suburban Agriculture) and LM (Light Manufacturing) to the PDC (Planned
Development Commercial) zoning district, which does not permit such heavy industrial
uses. MANATEE CTY., FLA., ZONING ORDINANCE PDC-04-16(Z)(P) (Oct. 12, 2010); MANATEE
CTY., FLA., LAND DEV. CODE § 402.11.
174 Kennedy, supra note 50.
175 Amaris Castillo, Tallevast Residents Give County Officials Earful Against Manatee
County’s New Transit Fleet Facility, BRADENTON HERALD, Oct. 22, 2014.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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have an abandoned building remaining on the Spindrift-Whogas property
on the western border of the community to be removed.178 Due to the
building’s former role in beryllium operations, however, residents were
concerned that demolition would spread additional toxins into the com-
munity.179 The property’s soil is contaminated with beryllium, as well as
arsenic, copper, and total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbon (“TRPH”),
and its groundwater is contaminated with heavy metals.180 FDEP, which
has assumed clean-up responsibility for the site, expects the SAR will be
completed in June 2015,181 with preparation of the RAP to follow.
Thus, the community was caught by surprise upon reading about
the permit approval in the newspaper, in which the director of the Manatee
County Building and Services Department stated demolition could begin
“within a day or two.”182
We had no idea, we were told some time ago that in order
to demolish the building, they would have to take special
precautions. . . . DEP has been in charge of evaluations
over the past year—they’ve been very private. . . . [T]hat’s
what we’ve asked, that it be taken down, it’s an eyesore
for the community, but I’m truly surprised.183
Beverly Bradley, who lives across the street from the building,
summarized the community’s feelings.
I would like to see it torn down but I would also like to see
it be torn down in the proper way. . . . [O]ur concern is
178 See Christopher Brantley, Controversy Surrounds Demolition of Suncoast Building,
WWSB-SBC 7 (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.mysyncoast.com/news/local/controversy-sur
rounds-demolition-of-suncoast-building/article_108f7482-b23f-11e4-bb0c-139f6ee847bc
.html [https://perma.cc/JE76-WBS3].
179 See Brantley, supra note 178; Aaron Eggleston, Building Near Tallevast Beryllium
Plant to Be Demolished, MYSUNCOAST (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.mysuncoast.com/mews
/local/building-near-tallevast-beryllium-plant-to-be-demolished/article_c08376d8-c228
-11e4-b803-a38e6b443a98.html [https://perma.cc/JX2X-WU3W].
180 SHAW ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., SAR FOR SPINDRIFT-WHOGAS, INC. § 7, p. 1–3 (Draft Aug.
2013). TRPH is found above industrial soil contamination target levels (SCTLs), the
others exceed residential SCTLs. Id.
181 Sara Kennedy, Part of Abandoned Tallevast Plant to be Demolished, BRADENTON
HERALD, Feb. 10, 2015.
182 Id.
183 Sara Kennedy, Decrepit Tallevast Building Slated for Demolition, BRADENTON HERALD,
Feb. 11, 2015.
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that whatever we have already been exposed, to that we
would be exposed to more of it. . . . [T]hey have no idea the
extent of what is in that building, other than it’s contami-
nated and I’m sure they know that.184
While FOCUS sought assurance that proper procedures for the
demolition of contaminated buildings were followed, representatives from
Manatee County, which issued the permit, and FDEP, who has responsi-
bility for the contaminated soil clean-up, were not forthcoming and dis-
regarded requests for a community meeting.185 Instead of relying on the
County or State agencies to provide assurances for potential health risks,
FOCUS funded air monitoring activities during the days on which demoli-
tion activities occurred.186
CONCLUSION
The community of Tallevast and the frustrations it has encoun-
tered in its pursuit for environmental justice are not unique. Regardless
of their location, all communities seeking just environmental outcomes
are confronted with obstacles. Some environmental justice communities,
however, face additional impediments if they happen to be located in
states that adhere to only the minimum requirements for delegation of
authority to administer federal environmental laws. The most obvious of
these differences may be substantive—setting pollution standards or
implementation plans, for example—or disparate levels of enforcement
by the state. Often, however, the possibility of success for an environ-
mental justice community may be determined by the less conspicuous
inequities in environmental and administrative procedures between the
States. Furthermore, within a state, unincorporated communities whose
most proximate level of government is a county, tend to have fewer
procedural protections than those located in a municipality.
As one former U.S. Congressman who played an influential role
in crafting many of the federal environmental laws enacted in the 1970s
stated, “The procedure is of exquisite importance. . . . I’ll let you write the
184 See Brantley, supra note 178.
185 See E-mail from Ana Gibbs, Fla. Dep’t Envtl. Prot., to Sally Tibbetts, Dist. Dir., U.S.
Rep. Vern Buchanan (Feb. 25, 2015) (copy on file with author); E-mail from John Barnott,
Dir., Manatee Co. Bldg. and Development Servs. Dept., to Sally Tibbetts, Dist. Dir., U.S.
Rep. Vern Buchanan (Feb. 12, 2015) (copy on file with author).
186 Christopher O’Donnell, Beryllium spike raises fear in Tallevast area, SARASOTA HERALD-
TRIBUNE, Feb. 9, 2011.
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substance on a statute, and you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw
you every time.”187 Procedural fairness and justice may be even more
important in the context of environmental justice, with community em-
powerment being one of the most important strategies for achieving envi-
ronmental justice.188 Residents of Tallevast and those similarly situated
understand the impacts procedural injustices have on their communities
as much as the direct, physical health effects from contamination and
other environmental harms.
The difficulties associated with procedural due process189 and other
constitutional claims to remedy environmental injustices often mean liti-
gation is an ineffective tool of last resort; however, two major avenues for
addressing procedural injustices could be: (1) EPA utilizing its discretion
to more closely scrutinize procedural requirements in the delegation of
authority under federal environmental laws,190 and (2) States recognizing
that “a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration . . .
will strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in
Government,”191 and change the laws accordingly. With the latter, unfor-
tunately, those type of changes come only after a major tragedy, too late
for at least one community.
187 Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. L. and Gov’t Relations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep.
John Dingell).
188 See R. Gregory Roberts, Environmental Justice and Community Empowerment: Learn-
ing from the Civil Rights Movement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 229 (1998); Luke W. Cole, Empower-
ment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law,
19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992).
189 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (finding that affording welfare recipi-
ents a pre-termination evidentiary hearing promotes “important government interests”
because “[w]elfare, by meeting the basic demand of subsistence, can help bring within the
reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate
meaningfully in the life of the community.”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35
(1976) (outlining the specific factors the Court will consider in procedural due process
challenges). Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
190 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
191 Office of the President, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed Reg 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009). Many
have questioned the Obama Administration’s commitment to this promise. See, e.g., Obama
Transparency, THE HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/obama-trans
parency/ [https://perma.cc/8GQF-ZMMP] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016); Paul D. Thacker,
Where the Sun Don’t Shine, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/politics/2013/03/barack_obama_promised_transparency_the_white_house
_is_as_opaque_secretive.html [https://perma.cc/37YN-XD48]; Josh Gerstein, President
Obama’s Muddy Transparency Record, POLITICO (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.politico.com
/news/stories/0312/73606.html [https://perma.cc/U9CE-UDK4].
